I. Introduction
Afundamental assumption of Alexius Meinong's Theory of Objects (i9o4) is the act-content-object (ACO) analysis of psychological experiences. I suggest that Meinong's theory need not be based on this analysis, but that an adverbial theory might suffice. I then defend the adverbial alternative against a recent objection raised by Roderick Chisholm, and conclude by presenting an apparently more serious objection based on a paradox discovered by Romane Clark.
II. An Adverbial Meinongian Theory
According to Meinong (i904), every psychological experience is "directed" towards something called its "object" (Gegenstand) (pp. 48 3ff). ('Object' is here used more in the sense of 'that which is aimed at' than 'individual thing' and is perhaps best thought of for the moment as elliptical for 'object of thought', where 'thought' is generic for 'psychological act'.) This is a version of Brentano's Thesis of Intentionality (Brentano (1874) P. 5o). As modified by Twardowski, it developed into the ACO-theory, according to which every psychological experience is analysable into an "act" which is directed to an object external to the experience by means of a "content" internal to the experience (cf. Grossmann (1974), Ch. III). This is based on the fundamental datum that every judgment or idea is a judgment or idea of something, where this is interpreted to mean that there is an act and an object of the act. But it seems equally plausible to interpret it to mean that there is an act which has a certain characteristic or which is "performed" or experienced in a certain manner. Thus interpreted, there would be no "pure" judgments or ideas: just as there is no "pure" colour, but only red, blue, etc., so there would be only, e.g. mountainlike ideas, ghostly ideas, etc. On the former interpretation, however, there is a pure act of, say, judging, in the sense that the act is distinguishable from the object.
Nevertheless, on the alternative theory I wish to consider (roughly, one conflating the content with the object), the act is an experience of a certain kind or is experienced in a certain manner; this seems sufficient as an explication of the phenomenon of "directedness". I here make no commitment to the truth of this alternative; I am only concerned to see whether a Meinongian theory of objects would be impossible were the alternative true. Since the "content" was defined as that part of the psychological experience which "directs" the act to its object, let us (Roughly, when one thinks Plato-ly, one's thought processes (be they mental or physical) "present" to the thinker properties and characteristics which, we are inclined to say in ordinary language, are (thought to be) had by Plato.) The AC-theory, then, may be taken as a version of an adverbial theory of thinking. On this theory, there are no "pure" acts of, say, thinking or fearing, nor is there any need for independent "objects" such as unicorns or ghosts which one might think about or fear. There would only be unified acts-of-a-kind or acts-in-a-kind-of-manner, such as "ghostly fearing". But clearly we can abstract an act of thinking and, so to speak, an "object" (i.e., a content or manner) of the act, and this abstracting allows us still to have a Theory of Objects. The Thesis of Intentionality can be preserved by interpreting it to mean that every act has a "manner", i.e., a content.
One difficulty is that the content is so intimately tied to the act that no two contents are identical, just as, on the ACO-theory, every two distinct acts have distinct contents, whether the acts be of distinct types or merely experienced by different people or at different times. Hence, in the AC-theory, we must talk of "content-types" or, perhaps, of AN ADVERBIAL MEINONGIAN THEORY 77 universals (or properties) whose particulars (or instances) are the individual contents (or content-tokens). Now, just as the ACO-theory must distinguish between individual acts (or act-tokens) and kinds of acts (or act-types) without thereby requiring a fourth component (making it an AtypeAtokenCO-theory), so the AC-theory, which needs content-tokens and content-types, need not be thought of as a three-component ACtypeCtoken-theory.
Nevertheless, the AC-theory augmented by content-types is isomorphic to the ACO-theory. Instead of a theory of objects on this view, we would have a theory of "manners" or contents. Such a theory would contain versions of the key theses of Meinong's original theory (cf. Rapaport (1978) ). For example, suppose I think of the golden mountain: since the golden mountain is golden, the object of my thought is golden. On the AC-theory, this could mean that I am thinking goldenly and mountainly, and, so, I am thinking goldenly. And by means of the content-type we can explain how it is possible for two people to think of the "same" thing: the contents of their thoughts are of the same kind; i.e., they are thinking in the same manner.
In Rapaport (I978), it is suggested that the ACO-theory needs to be augmented by a fourth component after all, viz., by the "actual" object (if any) corresponding to the Meinongian one. There is even stronger reason for thus augmenting the AC-theory: If I think, e.g., of Jimmy Carter, we can distinguish four items: myself (the thinker), the act (thinking), the content (Jimmy-Carter-ly), and Carter himself (the actual, physical object).
III. Chisholm's Objection
Roderick Chisholm (i973) has objected that interpreting (2) as (zA) renders invalid an argument-form which had been valid before.
Consider, first, (ii) Jones thinks only existentially. Now, the conclusion which follows from these adverbial premisses is:
(5Aiii) Jones's Quinely thinking is existentially thinking, i.e., some actual thing corresponds to Jones's Quinely thinking. Now, if (sA) is valid, as it seems to be, then (5Aiii) must be an adverbial reading of (5iii); i.e., to say that Quine exists is to say that (at least some instances of) thinking Quinely is (or, are instances of) thinking existentially. (This is spelled out in n. I and defended in Rapaport (1978) .) So, to say that unicorns exist is to say that (at least some instances of) thinking unicornically is (or, are instances of) thinking existentially. Thus, the complete adverbial paraphrase of (4) is not (4A), but (4B) (i) Jones thinks unicornically.
(ii) Jones thinks only existentially. .'.(iii) Jones's unicornically thinking is existentially thinking. Since this inference is valid, the adverbial theory is upheld. Call these P and P respectively. Finally, suppose that I think "of" (to return once again to the more idiomatic ACO-talk) an object with only the property P. Let m be the manner of my act of thinking thusly; i.e., mRP (and m "represents" nothing else).
Assume that mSP. Then VF(mRF-+mSF), and, so, mSP, which, on a reasonable requirement of consistency for the S-mode of predication (viz., VF(mSF4--+ ~ (mSF))) contradicts our assumption. So, ~(mSP).
Assume that ~ (mSP). Then 3F(mRF & ~ (mSF)), and, so (because m "represents" only i), ~-(mSP). This, on our consistency requirement, entails that mSP, contradicting our assumption. So, mSP. But, either mSP or ~(mSP). So, both ~(mSP) and mSP. This is the adverbial version of Clark's paradox. (Both Clark and the referee have suggested to me that the present paradox is reminiscent of Grelling's.) The adverbial theory appears to be inconsistent.
Clearly, there are many challengeable steps in the derivation of this form of the paradox. The most challengeable, it seems to me, is the assumption that because (to revert once more to ACO-talk) I am thinking "of" an object which is only P, therefore m represents P and nothing else. Perhaps the ACO-talk is too misleading; in the ACO-version of a Meinongian theory, a complex property could be the sole property of a Meinongian object, and the object's having that property would not force it to have any properties which might follow logically from its having that complex property. This is repugnant to many philosophers, though it is useful for resolving various philosophical puzzles (of the Hesperus-Phosphorus type; cf. Castafieda (I972)). The present suggestion is that the adverbial (AC) version might not have this repugnant feature and, thus, might avoid the paradox.
I am unhappy with this for several reasons. First, the usefulness of the lack of logical entailment just mentioned seems to be missing from the adverbial theory if we drop the assumption I characterized as 'most challengeable'. Second, and more importantly, this is an ad hoc way of avoiding the paradox. The paradox was discovered in connection with the ACO-version of a Meinongian theory (cf. Rapaport (1978) ), and
